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Economic Incentives for Legal Reform
The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and educa-
tors. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have
the approval of trustees on the Research and
Policy Committee. This committee is directed
under the bylaws, which emphasize that “all
research is to be thoroughly objective in char-
acter, and the approach in each instance is to
be from the standpoint of the general welfare
and not from that of any special political or
economic group.” The committee is aided by a
Research Advisory Board of leading social sci-
entists and by a small permanent professional
staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive dis-
cussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publica-
tion.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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Litigation, the enforcement mechanism of
our civil justice system, is too slow, intrusive,
expensive, and complex. At the same time that
defendants pay increasing amounts in dam-
ages, victims are not compensated fairly or
quickly for real injuries when they must rely on
litigation to obtain compensation. Our society
pays the enormous costs of running this ineffi-
cient and inequitable system. Thoughtful
people are looking for a better way.
This statement highlights some of the per-
verse economic incentives at work in our litiga-
tion system. CED’s Trustees believe that ap-
propriate incentives could help reallocate
monies away from litigation and non-economic
damages into providing more economic com-
pensation more quickly to more injured par-
ties, without litigation. This statement describes
two CED recommendations: Early Offers and
Auto Choice insurance.
Litigation is only the enforcement tip of
the larger legal system. While preparing this
policy statement, we identified other serious
problems regarding our civil justice system.
The scope of our laws, the increased role of
the courts in law making and social policy, and
the role of the legal profession and legal edu-
cation require examination and discussion.
These fundamental issues are beyond the pur-
view of this report, and we do not attempt to
address them here. Most Americans, however,
are not aware of these issues or their economic
and social consequences. We are therefore con-
vinced of the need to raise awareness through
broad and informed public debate about our
legal system and its effects on our society. We
hope that this policy statement will spur such a
debate.
Purpose of This Statement
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1Introduction
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW
America is built on the rule of law. Rebel-
ling from the power and asserted moral au-
thority of hereditary monarchs, our country
was founded on the principle that government
is created by the governed and is controlled by
them. This ideal is given practical application
by law. A hallmark of our society consequently
is that we are to be governed by laws, demo-
cratically enacted, rather than by the fiat of
individuals exercising government authority.
Reliance on the law helped develop, and
itself was given further impetus by, the country’s
commitment to the free-enterprise system. A
complex market economy, operating across a
continental nation, required strangers to deal
with each other. Law provided the institutional
framework for doing so. Law also served as a
glue to bind into one nation the immigrants
from various cultures who have made America.
America is thus held together, philosophi-
cally and psychologically, economically and
politically, by shared commitment to the su-
premacy of law. We depend on a fair, credible,
and efficient legal system to enforce economic
and social policies embodied in law, to protect
citizens from unwarranted actions by govern-
ment, to enforce the rules of commerce, and
to provide remedies for wrongs done by one to
another. A smoothly functioning and respected
legal system is essential to the prosperity and,
more importantly, to the freedom of all Ameri-
cans.
Derek Bok, then President of Harvard Uni-
versity and a former law school professor and
dean, was one of the first national leaders to
decry the state of the American legal system in
his 1983 report to the University’s Board of
Overseers. At the same time he reminded us
that:
there is much in our law that represents a
triumph of the human spirit: the steadfast
defense of individual freedom and civil lib-
erties, the constant elevation of reason over
prejudice and passion, the protections af-
forded to minority and disadvantaged
groups.1
DRAWBACKS OF THE
LITIGATION SYSTEM
As President Bok described, however, the
legal system is not serving Americans as it
should.  The problem is particularly evident in
the enforcement mechanism of the law — liti-
gation. When there are disputes, the relevant
facts must be found, and the applicable law
must be identified, interpreted, and applied to
those facts. Litigation is the process for per-
forming these essential tasks. It comes, how-
ever, at a price — economic and social — that
is paid by the litigants and by our society as a
whole.
As Part I of this policy statement will de-
scribe, civil litigation is too intrusive, too slow
and, too expensive. Most injured people avoid
it.2 There is a lack of confidence in the result
when the process is invoked. In particular, the
amount of compensation people who are in-
jured by the act of another recover through
the litigation process typically is in inverse rela-
tionship to their actual loss. The current com-
pensation system does not adequately provide
*
*See memorandum by JOSH S. WESTON (page 33).
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justice. As a result, respect for the law and the
legal process, which is essential to American
democracy, is eroded.
The litigation process is a vital tool of a
constitutional democracy. It is essential to the
rule of law. But it must be made more efficient,
fairer, and less intrusive. Numerous efforts al-
ready are being made to improve various dis-
crete parts of the litigation system. Because
these reforms entail detailed changes in laws
and rules, they require the expertise of lawyers
and judges. Here we recommend a less techni-
cal, and more basic, approach to reform.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON WAYS
TO AVOID LITIGATION
We believe that it is not enough merely
to improve the conduct of litigation — even
assuming that this goal can be accomplished.
Americans should be offered alternatives that
make it possible and worthwhile for them to
avoid litigation. We recommend in Part II,
therefore, two specific innovative reforms that
introduce economic incentives to provide fair
compensation in appropriate circumstances,
quickly and without litigation. They allow both
plaintiffs and defendants to capture and share
the savings that result from avoiding litigation:
1. We recommend ways to provide incentives
for potential defendants to make offers to
pay victims’ economic damages soon after
an adverse event and to encourage poten-
tial claimants to accept. These Early Offers
would offer people a choice. Injured parties
could obtain fair compensation quickly,
when they need it, and without having to
resort to the delay, expense, and trauma of
litigation.
2.  In addition, in one discrete area, we recom-
mend the adoption of Auto Choice, which
would give motorists a choice between two
different types of insurance. Auto Choice
would allow a driver to continue under the
present system, with fault for an accident
being determined through the litigation sys-
tem and with the possibility of recovering
non-economic, as well as economic, dam-
ages. Or the motorist could choose an alter-
native system that pays compensation for
economic (but not non-economic) loss re-
sulting from personal injury, without litiga-
tion. Drivers choosing the former approach
would pay premiums comparable to what
they pay now; those choosing the latter al-
ternative would pay significantly lower in-
surance premiums and in most cases receive
compensation more quickly and without
having to litigate.
These mechanisms share a common ap-
proach. They recycle the amounts now spent
on lawyers’ fees and other litigation expenses
and on payment of non-economic damages
into compensation for actual financial loss for
more victims, more quickly, and without litiga-
tion. They increase consumers’ choices and
offer them new advantages.
These mechanisms will not fix the litigation
process and are not intended to do so. They
will not, nor should they, eliminate litigation.
They will, however, benefit all of American
society (other than some lawyers and the ancil-
lary businesses nurtured and sustained by liti-
gation) by creating alternatives to litigation
and thus reducing the transaction costs the
present compensation system requires. They
represent balanced reform.  They benefit plain-
tiffs, defendants, and society as a whole. They
provide new choices and new rights. Our rec-
ommendations, therefore, bypass the political
deadlock that has stymied tort reform and
promise a new approach.
BEYOND THIS STATEMENT
Our recommendations are important in
themselves. They also represent a new direc-
tion for reform and, we hope, will catalyze
further efforts to develop additional alterna-
tives to litigation. The reforms we recommend
are not the only possible ones; more work by
more people is needed.
In developing our recommendations, more-
over, we became convinced that long-lasting
3and fundamental reform is possible only if
there is a broad and informed public debate
on the benefits and drawbacks of litigation and
of possible alternatives to it. This debate should
be sponsored and led by leaders of the broader
community, as well as by lawyers and the courts.
Thus it is particularly important that there be
participation by consumer and business groups,
the media, and academia (including not only
law school professors, but economists, busi-
ness school professors, sociologists, psycholo-
gists, and political scientists).
This debate must include a re-examination
of the assumptions that have fostered reliance
on litigation. Because litigation is the enforce-
ment tip of the larger legal system, it also must
consider the role and scope of law and the
process by which law is made. These issues are
beyond the scope of this policy statement, which
focuses on two specific recommendations. How-
ever, we believe this debate should be the next
step in reform, and we describe briefly funda-
mental issues that should be considered.
The country has acted, or more accurately
has allowed the legal community to act, on the
unexamined assumption that litigation is the
standard and expected way to right private
wrongs, determine compensation for injury,
and resolve many matters of economic and
social policy. By a process of slow but steady
accretion, the conventional intellectual and
political wisdom has come to favor litigation.
Institutional and financial incentives to litigate
have been built into the system. As Walter
Olson, a fervent critic of the litigation culture
and its effect on American society, has ob-
served, “America did not begin litigating more
and harder because its population suddenly
took it into its head to become more conten-
tious. We got more lawsuits because those who
shaped our legal system wanted more lawsuits.”3
Academia, the courts, the legal profession, and
legislatures have all encouraged litigation.
Legislatures have created a wide variety of
new obligations that affect most Americans and
give rise to rights that can be individually en-
forced through private litigation. In addition,
statutes too often are written in broad terms
and vague language. These legislative gaps leave
the real decision making to administrative and
judicial fiat, violating the fundamental prin-
ciple that we are governed by laws and not by
individuals, and they have increased the need
(and the opportunity) to litigate.4 Beyond the
failings of legislation, the courts have often
expanded statutory rights and, independently
of legislation, have expanded common law
rights on the basis of their views of what is good
public policy.5
The public discussion that we urge, there-
fore, should consider whether creating indi-
vidual rights coupled with large penalties for
violations is the only, or the best, way to carry
out social policies. The American people may
want to explore other approaches that rely less
on litigation and more on education.
They should also consider, if new rights are
created, the appropriate roles of legislatures
and courts in creating new rights. This should
include examination of the extent to which the
courts should impose liability for actions that
are lawful. In extending legislation and creat-
ing new legal rights, the courts enter into areas
that traditionally have been left to the citizens
or their elected representatives. Court deci-
sions often affect the general population, not
merely the litigants before it, and result in
social and economic micro-regulation by the
courts.6 Courts, however, are less well suited
than legislatures to consider how much it will
cost to comply with any law they make, when it
should apply, and what exceptions should be
made.
The independence the courts are given to
decide cases free of political considerations
ironically gives them the ability to make politi-
cal decisions without the constraints under
which legislatures operate. In fact, the general
community often is not even aware of new law
created by court decisions. Since courts in
theory do not make new law but apply and
interpret existing laws, their decisions apply
retroactively, imposing new standards of con-
duct on actions taken years before.7
Introduction
4The Economist has pointed out the dangers
of making social policy through litigation:
American public officials have usurped demo-
cratic debate on both tobacco and hand-
guns by launching a wave of lawsuits de-
signed to win through legal threats what they
have been unable to win in Congress and
state legislatures — stricter regulation and
heavier taxation. This unjustified recourse
to the courts, unique in the world, now poses
a bigger threat to Americans than either
tobacco or guns….using the courts to bully
industries in this way is an abuse of the legal
process and an evasion of democratic ac-
countability…. A legal system which, despite
its occasional excesses, enjoys the support of
most Americans will be brought into disre-
pute. Any rational debate about balancing
choice with risk will be abandoned as irrel-
evant. Legislation will be replaced by litiga-
tion, deliberation by legal threats….If
America is ever to get its priorities right on
tobacco, guns or any other issue, it will do so
only in the debating chamber of democrati-
cally elected legislatures, not through threats
of mass litigation.8
Some people may disagree with this view.
But they should consider explicitly the conse-
quences of allowing courts to make these deci-
sions.
The public debate that we urge should also
consider the role of legal education and aca-
demic research in developing alternatives to
litigation and in encouraging and training law-
yers to resolve rather than exacerbate conflict.
And it should debate the meaning of profes-
sionalism in light of current economic and
legal conditions, including the manner in which
attorneys’ compensation is fashioned.
Litigation is personally profitable to the law-
yer — whether representing the plaintiff or
defendant, whether paid an hourly rate or a
percentage of any recovery on a contingency
basis — because of the intensity, complexity,
and length of litigation, and because of the
amount of money that may be involved. These
incentives to litigate are compounded by the
economic pressures and leveraged internal
compensation arrangements under which large
law firms operate. As professionals, however,
lawyers are expected not to maximize profits
but rather to act in the best interest of their
clients. Reflecting this principle of profession-
alism, lawyers’ Canons of Ethics require that
fees be reasonable, not whatever can be ex-
tracted from their client. However, the profes-
sionalism of lawyers has been greatly eroded in
recent years. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has
observed, “The practice of law in the United
States has evolved from a profession to a busi-
ness, with all that those terms connote: empha-
sis on making money, increased competition
for clients, increased mobility of lawyers.”9
The changed role of lawyers as self-inter-
ested entrepreneurs has come to be accepted
as if it were normal and right. This situation is
reflected most baldly in connection with the
fees for the lawyers who brought cases against
the tobacco companies on behalf of state gov-
ernments. Omnibus Federal tobacco legisla-
tion in 1998 would have imposed caps on those
fees. One Senator opposed a cap of $4,000 per
hour on the ground that since the government
does not limit profits, it should not limit the
fees charged by lawyers, who are nothing less
than “legal businesspersons.”10  This legisla-
tion was not enacted. Through arbitration, law-
yers representing six states have already been
awarded $9 billion. With attorneys in 35 states
still awaiting arbitration, total fees may be in
excess of $20 billion for a relatively small num-
ber of lawyers.11  No one can seriously consider
fees at this level to be reasonable. Nor is it
apparent why it was necessary or appropriate
for state attorneys general to enter into contin-
gency fee arrangements in the first place.
These and similar issues relating to the role
of litigation in American society need to be
explicitly considered by the American people.
In emphasizing the importance of resolving
disputes without litigation and implementing
mechanisms for doing so, we mean to set the
stage for this larger debate.
Breaking the Litigation Habit
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The Nature of Litigation
THE LITIGATION MECHANISM
Every lawsuit, even if necessary, has an ad-
verse effect on the litigants. Rules governing
the conduct of litigation are difficult to en-
force and are often violated. Even permitted
conduct is damaging to the litigants and to
bystanders.
Litigation is inherently bitter and highly
intrusive. Litigants are permitted to delve into
private matters and proprietary information of
their opponents, and even of non-parties,
through the “discovery” process. Often neces-
sary to develop relevant facts, discovery too
frequently extends to matters only tangentially
related to the dispute.
Litigation is complex. Detailed factual re-
search is necessary in most cases, a process that
may involve abstruse scientific, technical, medi-
cal, or economic matters. The applicable law is
often vague and complex. As the number of
statutes, regulations, and court decisions has
grown, the amount of potentially applicable
law that must be researched and applied to the
particular case has increased.
An injured party who must resort to litiga-
tion is denied compensation while the process
plays out. Litigants often must wait years for
decisions. The time it takes to resolve a case
depends on the complexity of the particular
matter, the amount of litigation machinery the
litigants set in motion, and the extent of disci-
pline exercised by the judge. It also turns on
external factors such as the court’s overall
workload of both civil and criminal cases (crimi-
nal cases typically are given precedence). The
time it takes to go to trial, therefore, varies
greatly among jurisdictions, but is often too
long. In Los Angeles, for instance, it takes five
years on average for a civil case to go to trial.12
That, of course, is not the entire story. After a
case has gone to trial, there may be appeals, at
one, two, or perhaps three levels. And in some
instances, an appellate court may remand the
case to the trial court for a new trial or further
proceedings. Each step adds delay, cost, and
uncertainty for the parties.
Although only approximately 3–4 percent
of lawsuits that are filed actually go to trial,13
little comfort should be drawn from this. Most
cases are dropped or settled only after they
have gone through much of the discovery pro-
cess, legal and factual research, and motions
practice. Discovery alone is estimated to com-
prise 80 percent of the cost of a fully litigated
case.14 Even if a claim does not go to trial, the
average time to settle a product liability claim
is two years from the event.15
Litigation provides ample opportunity for
abuse by both plaintiffs and defendants. A party
can use the available procedural mechanisms
to wear down the opposition by delay and ex-
pense. Discovery tools permit a litigant to ha-
rass the opposition by making burdensome and
intrusive requests for information and docu-
ments, accompanied by the threat of disclos-
ing confidential or embarrassing information
extracted through the discovery process. There
is an almost limitless number of facts that can
be examined and witnesses who can be inter-
viewed or deposed. There is also an infinite
supply of legal arguments that can be made.
And a litigant can often create a new argu-
ment, hoping that some court may be sympa-
6thetic, adopt the new theory, and turn it into
law. Every interaction between the parties can
be turned into a motion: “Discovery and mo-
tions practice provide a near-inexhaustible rep-
ertoire of ways for litigants to tease, worry, irk,
goad, pester, trouble, rage, torment, pique,
molest, bother, vex, nettle, and annoy each
other.”16 The process heavily favors well-fi-
nanced and unscrupulous parties.
The mere threat of litigation can be used
for leverage. A person can file a complaint and
set the litigation machinery in motion even
without specific information of wrongdoing. It
often is not difficult to find some minimal
ground on which to base a complaint or de-
fense. A trumped-up lawsuit or frivolous de-
fense of one is thus a powerful tool for unscru-
pulous competitors or others who seek leverage
in business dealings. Because the threat, or
even mere implication, of litigation is so unset-
tling, it may be enough merely to suggest the
filing of a suit or the pursuit of an abusive
defense to force the other party to do the threat-
ening party’s bidding. Litigation provides a
powerful tool for economic extortion on mat-
ters having nothing to do with the purported
subject matter of the litigation.
Complexity and time translate into expense.
Lawyers and substantive experts must be paid
to prepare the facts and research the law. Each
party must prepare both sides of the case. The
adversarial process provides an opportunity for
a party to throw roadblocks in the way of the
other at each step of the process. Each motion
and each opposition costs a significant amount
of money. The longer a lawsuit is pending, the
more expensive it is likely to be. The expense
and delay of litigation result in the paradox
articulated by President Bok — “far too much
law for those who can afford it and far too little
for those who cannot.”17
Most citizens whose rights have been vio-
lated cannot afford to pay a lawyer to seek
redress. They can, however, shift the risk of the
litigation cost to their lawyers by entering into
contingency fee arrangements, which provide
injured parties with access to counsel and the
courts. Claimants who cannot afford to hire a
lawyer can proceed with their case and the
lawyer is paid a percentage of any recovery. If
there is no recovery, the attorney is not paid. If
the plaintiff ultimately prevails, the lawyer cus-
tomarily is paid 30-40 percent, or as much as 50
percent, of any judgment that may finally be
collected. These fees are presumed to be justi-
fied by the risk assumed by the lawyer that
there will be no recovery and thus no fee.
In some cases, because of a lack of informa-
tion or competition, clients may not be able to
negotiate a contingency fee that properly re-
flects their attorneys’ risk. Lawyers are paid an
inappropriate premium where the contingency
fee compensates them for risks they are not
incurring—to the detriment of their clients.
This can occur when liability is not in doubt,
where a case is settled early in litigation, or
where the parameters of recovery have largely
been set by previous litigation.
Contingency fees may pose additional draw-
backs for claimants. They inevitably create in-
centives for lawyers to find and pursue most
vigorously those cases offering the largest re-
coveries relative to time expended, and to avoid
or abandon cases where the defendant is the
most obdurate and has the financial resources
to most vigorously resist and delay. Defendants
may exploit these incentives by using the tools
of litigation to force the attorney to spend
more time on a case. They may exploit the
possible conflict of interest between the plain-
tiff and his lawyer by prolonging discovery in
the hope of forcing the lawyer to recommend a
lower settlement to avoid having to spend more
time on the case.
Even a victorious plaintiff may not recover
his economic loss in full, because he must pay
his lawyer a substantial portion of the judg-
ment. Recovery of damages for non-economic
loss in effect pays for the litigation process
required to collect economic damages. But,
according to one study, more than one-third of
the plaintiffs who obtained a judgment won no
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7damages for non-economic injury,18 which im-
plies that their lawyers’ fees had to come out of
damages awarded to compensate them for eco-
nomic loss.
The contingency fee system thus depends
on the payment of non-economic damages,
which are intended to compensate a victim
with money for the non-financial consequences
of an injury. Traditionally, such compensation
was provided principally for the pain and suf-
fering incurred, and the awards were small.19
In more recent times, new theories of liability
for non-economic damages have been devel-
oped. Plaintiffs now can recover compensation
on additional theories such as mental distress,
hedonic damages (loss of the pleasure of life),
loss of consortium (the company of one’s
spouse or, as newly expanded, one’s child),
damages caused by knowing one is going to
die, etc. These theories are additive, not mutu-
ally exclusive, creating a galaxy of possible
grounds for recovery for any one injury.
Awards for this category of damages are
subjective. “The standard procedure is to leave
the issue to the jury, in the apparent hope that
jurors can fill the intellectual void left by the
courts and legal scholars.”20 Compensation var-
ies widely, and is affected by the type of in-
jury.21 Depending on the type of injury, non-
economic damages may constitute one-third to
one-half or more of the amount awarded.22
Awards for non-economic damages typically are
small, but a few are very large, representing the
principal part of the award.23
One type of non-economic damages, in par-
ticular, has become important in recent years.
With little effective control, punitive damages
have rapidly increased in number and size.
These are awarded as punishment and to deter
others from engaging in similar conduct. Pun-
ishment and deterrence are concepts of crimi-
nal law, but are introduced into civil cases by
giving juries an explicit invitation to “punish.”
Even if the defendant violated a criminal law
that provides a specific penalty, the jury in a
civil case can impose its own view of punish-
ment independently of the criminal law. An
act for which the criminal fine is a few hundred
dollars can be punished by the imposition of a
civil penalty in the millions of dollars. The
defendant is therefore subject to being required
to pay judgments on the basis of subjective
factors, without having any of the protections
that are provided in criminal law (including a
higher standard of proof), and without limits
tied to the amount of economic damage. In
addition, an act that affects more than one
claimant can lead to multiple punitive damage
awards, as each plaintiff recovers his own puni-
tive damages.
The United States Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of imposing punitive
damages that are not “grossly excessive.” 24 The
courts, however, have not provided a meaning-
ful definition of what is “grossly excessive” even
within the context of review by the trial judge
and the appellate courts. Worse, juries are given
no meaningful standards in making the awards
in the first instance. Punitive damages, there-
fore, are unpredictable and highly variable.25
Punitive damages are an open invitation to
juries, with little effective judicial control, to
grant plaintiffs huge awards. Juries do not un-
derstand that consumers ultimately pay much
of these awards through increased prices.
A recent study analyzed punitive damage
awards in five jurisdictions from 1985 to 1994
in cases that did not involve personal injury.
Punitive damages were awarded in 14 percent
of all verdicts during the period. In the period
1990–1994 punitive damage awards represented
almost 60 percent of the total amount of dam-
ages awarded; in 1985–1989 they had consti-
tuted approximately 44 percent of the total.
The average award for punitive damages more
than doubled, from $3.4 million in the earlier
period to $7.6 million (in constant dollars) in
the more recent one.26
Another study of punitive damage awards
confirmed by the appellate courts in five states
(with more than one-third of the U.S. popula-
tion) found similar increases. It compared the
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8four-year periods 1968–1971 and 1988–1991 to
determine the amount of punitive damages
that were affirmed in cases against business
enterprises. It found that the total of punitive
damages increased from $1.1 million in the
earlier period to $343 million (in nominal dol-
lars) in the later one. In real terms, this was an
increase of approximately 89 fold. Because of
its design and the time periods under review,
the study is conservative. It did not include
judgments that were not appealed. It did not
include $533 million in punitive damages
awarded against one defendant in 1992.27 Nor
did it include the $1 billion in punitive dam-
ages affirmed against another in 1985 for inter-
ference with contractual relations (reduced on
appeal from $3 billion).28
In addition, punitive damages increasingly
have been incorporated into regulatory stat-
utes for the express purpose of encouraging
litigation. The Civil Rights Act was amended in
1991 to permit recovery of non-economic dam-
ages on various theories (including punitive
damages), with a sliding scale of limits based
on the size of the defendant’s workforce.29
The few, dramatically large awards of non-
economic damages are particularly well publi-
cized. The attitude engendered by the combi-
nation of contingent fee arrangements and
peoples’ hope they will recover the kind of
large judgments for non-economic damages
that they read about is summed up in two
bumper stickers: “Hit me, I need the money”
(displayed by hopeful plaintiffs to potential
defendants) and “All you need is an accident
and a dream” (displayed by lawyers to attract
the hopeful plaintiffs who have succeeded in
being hit).30
There is an immediate need to bring some
rationality to the process of awarding those
damages. We believe that, at a minimum, the
award of punitive damages should be subject
to the same rules as criminal penalties. They
should be imposed only when the conduct at
issue is found to have been willful within the
meaning of the criminal law. The standard of
proof should be the standard necessary for
criminal conviction (beyond a reasonable
doubt). Juries should not have essentially un-
controlled discretion to punish as they see fit.
The jury’s role should be limited to a determi-
nation that punitive damages should be im-
posed. The judge, not the jury, should deter-
mine the amount, within pre-determined limits,
like the penalties specified in criminal law and
sentencing guidelines.
One possible standard would be to tie puni-
tive damages to the amount of damages for
economic loss that is recovered, although this
provides a continuing incentive to falsify eco-
nomic damages. A bill in Congress aimed spe-
cifically at reforming punitive damages would
provide that the amount of such damages could
not exceed three times the amount of eco-
nomic loss.31
 Finally, in determining the amount of any
punitive damages, the amount the defendant
has already paid as a result of the conduct at
issue should be taken into account. The pun-
ishment should not be cumulative from plain-
tiff to plaintiff.32
INEFFICIENT AND INEQUITABLE
COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
It is telling that in a compensation system
operated through litigation, most victims of
wrongful conduct do not sue.33 Rather than
compensating people fairly for their actual
losses, the system provides no compensation
for the majority of injured individuals who do
not litigate. When victims do sue, the system
typically fails to compensate those who are more
seriously injured for their actual damages, but
awards excessive damages to those who are
only slightly injured. Thus, many injured vic-
tims receive no compensation; many are un-
derpaid; and some are overpaid. The system is
not rational.
A study by the Insurance Services Office, a
service agency of liability insurers, found that
one-third of all product liability claims were
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9closed with no payment. Some unascertainable
amount of these were injured parties who were
unable to pursue a claim because they could
not identify the wrongdoer or because of legal
roadblocks. But for those who prevailed, the
proportion of economic losses recovered de-
creased as losses increased. Those with losses
less than $100,000 on average recovered more
than 100 percent of their economic loss. Those
with losses above $100,000 recovered less than
their full losses, and individuals with losses in
excess of $1 million received only 6 percent.34
The same pattern is found in the system for
compensating victims of automobile crashes.
There are broad gaps in compensation. Thirty
percent of all injured persons recover noth-
ing.35 As shown in Figure 1, victims with eco-
nomic loss between $500 and $1,000 were com-
pensated two and a half times their loss; those
with losses between $25,000 and $100,000 re-
ceived 56 percent of their loss; and those who
had economic loss over $100,000 recovered
only 9 percent.36
The compensation of injured victims turns
on the fortuity of the amount of insurance
carried by the wrongdoer.37 Low minimum in-
surance requirements are a result of the high
cost of insurance, driven by the cost of deter-
mining who is a wrongdoer and the payment
of non-economic damages.
The process produces other anomalies. Fe-
male plaintiffs win larger judgments for pain
and suffering than males for the same injury;
older plaintiffs get more than younger ones.38
And “people with lower incomes and lower
educational levels recover less [a smaller per-
centage of their economic loss] than their
middle-class counterparts because they have
less access to attorneys, cannot afford to wait as
long to recover and often are not good witnesses.”39
As Professor Jeffrey O’Connell, a leading ana-
lyst of the tort system, sums up the process,
“There is no real reason behind it all.”40
Running compensation through the litiga-
tion system entails transaction costs that are at
least as great as the amount of compensation
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Figure 1
Compensation for Economic Loss
in Automobile Injuries under the
Tort System
SOURCE: Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Auto Choice:
Impact on Cities and the Poor, 1998.
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victims receive. It is estimated that for automo-
bile injuries, the net compensation received by
winning plaintiffs was 52 percent of total litiga-
tion expenditures; for other torts, it was 43
percent; and for asbestos cases, it was 37 per-
cent.41 Calculated another way, only 28 per-
cent of the insurance dollar actually goes to
the victims of medical malpractice, and 33 per-
cent to victims of product liability.42 Victims of
automobile accidents receive only 14.5 per-
cent of the amount spent for insurance to
cover economic losses from bodily injury. Al-
most double that amount (28.4 percent) is
spent in attorneys’ fees.43 See Figure 2, page10.
The United States Department of Trans-
portation conducted a comprehensive study
10
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of automobile accidents in 1971. It found that
the tort system:
…ill serves the accident victim, the insuring
public and society. It is inefficient, overly
costly, incomplete and slow. It allocates ben-
efits poorly, discourages rehabilitation and
overburdens the courts and the legal system.
Both on the record of its performance and
the logic of its operation, it does little if
anything to minimize crash losses.44
It has been estimated that the cost of oper-
ating the tort litigation system (lawyers’ fees,
public expenditures, and the time of litigants)
exceeds the net recoveries of tort victims by 15
to 19 percent.45 In succinct terms, “lawsuits are
absurdly slow, capricious, and inefficient: of
the money they shift around, more than half
gets dissipated in the process of transfer. And
much of that winds up in the pockets of
what…may be the most prosperous body of
professionals in the world.”46
Only a few plaintiffs and their lawyers ben-
efit from the compensation system. But the
costs are borne by all consumers in the form of
higher prices. This particularly affects the poor.
As Professor Priest notes:
…low-income consumers have less money
generally and…are more seriously affected
in terms of the purchasing power of their
limited resources where the price level
increases.…[At the same time] low-income
consumers, if injured, are less likely to seek
an attorney; even with an attorney, are less
likely to sue; less likely to recover; and, again
by definition, less likely to recover large dam-
age judgments since their lost income is typi-
cally low and pain and suffering awards,
which are highly correlated with lost income,
equally low.47
There is, in addition, widespread doubt that
juries are capable of making appropriate fact
determinations in complex business or techni-
Figure 2
Distribution of Bodily Injury Premiums for Automobile Injuries
SOURCE: Adapted from Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Auto Choice: Impact on Cities and the Poor, 1998.
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cal matters. The
law they are re-
quired to apply is
often too complex
for laymen (and in
many cases for
judges as well) to
apply with cred-
ibility.48 Jury deci-
sions often appear
to be entirely for-
tuitous or based
on inappropriate
factors. The sub-
stantive law de-
clared by the
courts is often
complex and to
many observers
not infrequently
defies common
sense. The impo-
sition of liability is
unpredictable ,
leading to doubt
as to whether jus-
tice is served in
many cases.49 As
Professor O’Connell explains, “The fundamen-
tal problem of tort liability, especially in the
areas of product liability and medical malprac-
tice, stems from the unpredictability of its im-
position.”50
 Chief Justice Warren Burger, himself a
former trial attorney, described the nature of
the litigation system in America succinctly: “Our
system is too costly, too painful, too destruc-
tive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people.”51
Relying on it to provide compensation comes
at great cost.52
HARM TO SOCIETY AS A WHOLE
The costs of the litigation process are not
borne only by the litigants. The process ulti-
mately affects all Americans, socially and eco-
nomically.
Figure 3
Tort Costs as a Percentage of GDP in 1994:
An International Perspective
SOURCE: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, Tort Cost Trends: An International
Perspective, 1995.
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There are no
comprehensive
data on the cost of
the litigation sys-
tem. However, the
extent of these
costs is apparent
from several dis-
tinct perspectives.
Expenditures
of insurance com-
panies to cover
tort claims have
been tracked for a
number of years.
(The tort system is
only one part of
the litigation sys-
tem and an even
smaller part of
the overall legal
s y s t e m . ) T h e s e
expenditures in-
clude compen-
sation paid to
plaintiffs (both legitimate awards and those
that might be inappropriate) as well as transac-
tion costs incurred by insurance companies.
Such measures of costs thus include the real
economic burden on society resulting from
the transaction costs and financial transfers
from defendants and their insurers to plain-
tiffs, and to lawyers on both sides.
The data from these studies indicate that
expenditures on the tort system (including
transfers) have constantly increased, particu-
larly sharply since 1984. By this rough estimate,
tort system expenditures alone represented 2.3
percent of the country’s GDP ($151.5 billion)
in 1994, about twice the proportion of 1966
and four times that of 1950.53 As shown in
Figure 3, other industrialized countries devote
far less of their resources to a tort system.
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The amount the United States spends to run a
system of individualized fault-determination
and compensation is reflected in the cost and
thus the price of products sold and used, and
services provided, in the United States. “It is,”
as one commentator has noted, “one of the
most ubiquitous taxes we pay, now levied on
virtually everything we buy, sell, and use.” While
it is called a “safety tax,” “its exact relationship
to safety is mysterious. It is paid on many items
that are risky to use…but it weighs even more
heavily on other items whose whole purpose is
to make life safer.”54
These cost estimates reflect only the costs
caused by the tort system, not the litigation
system more generally. Nor do they reflect the
legal and management costs incurred in un-
derstanding and complying with numerous
complex regulatory laws and executing various
kinds of contracts,
all under the
shadow of possible
litigation, public
or private. The to-
tal cost the legal
system imposes on
the U.S. economy
is not known.
One indicator
of the scope of the
overall cost of the
legal system, how-
ever, can be found
in Census Bureau
statistics on the
revenues of profit-
making law firms.
Just since 1967
(through 1996),
their receipts have
more than qua-
drupled, increas-
ing from approxi-
mately $30 billion
to approximately
$125 billion in
constant dollars.
Their share of GDP has doubled, from 0.8
percent to 1.6 percent in the same time pe-
riod. See Figure 4. As Derek Bok has observed,
the money that is channeled through the legal
system attracts some of the brightest and most
energetic people to become lawyers, diverting
them from other activities with greater eco-
nomic and social value.55
The manner in which the legal system oper-
ates also discourages the introduction of new
products in the U.S. market and deprives Ameri-
cans of products that are available elsewhere in
the world. We know of no comprehensive study
of the impact, but a number of surveys indicate
the extent of the problem. Three out of four
engineering firms surveyed by the American
Consulting Engineers Council in 1994-95 said
the threat of lawsuits slowed innovation, and a
1995 study at Duke University reported that
fear of litigation
stifled research
and development
in many major in-
dustries.56 A survey
by the Conference
Board found that
47 percent of
manufac turer s
have withdrawn
products from the
U.S. market be-
cause of fear of liti-
gation, and 25
percent have dis-
continued some
product research
for that reason.57
At the same time,
fear of the liability
system forces pro-
ducers increas-
ingly to reallocate
resources from
new products and
innovations to in-
surance and self-
insurance.58
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Figure 4
Receipts of Taxable Law Firms, 1967-1996
Receipts in millions of 1996$
SOURCE: 1967-77 Census of Business; 1978-1996 Service Annual Survey,
Bureau of the Census.
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The International Institute for Management
Development in Switzerland compiles a World
Competitiveness Yearbook each year by asking
businesses in various countries to evaluate their
product liability (tort) systems. In 1999, the
United States ranked 32nd worst out of 47 coun-
tries with respect to the degree its legal frame-
work is detrimental to competitiveness, and
44th worst on the extent to which its liability
systems restricts business.
While there has been strong economic
growth and innovation in the United States,
litigation costs nonetheless act as a drag on an
economy that would have done even better
without them.
Social Costs
The emphasis on litigation has broader so-
cial consequences. It encourages people to
quickly resort to claims and litigation if they
are injured or think that some right, or pos-
sible right, has been violated. The ordinary
slights and frustrations of life too quickly be-
come the grist for litigation. Worse, the prom-
ise of easy money through litigation (even
though often chimerical) has encouraged
people to exaggerate the effect of an injury
and their economic loss. The obvious incentive
to exaggerate economic loss has been exacer-
bated by the lure of large non-economic dam-
ages in personal injury cases, which typically
are awarded at the ratio of 2 to 3 times the
plaintiff’s proven economic damages.59 The
temptation to inflate economic losses (mainly
medical costs) thus is compounded by the award
of non-economic damages. Consequently, 35–
42 percent of claimed medical costs in automo-
bile personal injury cases are estimated to be
excessive.60 The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion estimates that each American family pays
$200 annually in higher auto insurance premi-
ums to pay for exaggerated and fraudulent
claims.61
A 1997 survey by the Insurance Research
Council revealed that the number of Ameri-
cans who think it is permissible to pad claims
doubled in 4 years. Among young people (ages
18-24), almost two-thirds said claims padding
was acceptable.62 An earlier study by this group
indicated that between 1987 and 1992 the num-
ber of automobile injury claims for sprains and
strains, which are more difficult to verify, was
“skyrocketing” and that medical treatment costs
increased dramatically even though the claims
showed less serious injuries, fewer hospital stays,
and fewer disabilities.63 At the same time, out-
right lying in litigation has increased. A recent
newspaper article observed that, “Historically,
lying has been most common in criminal
cases…. Now it is creeping into civil cases with
some regularity.”64
Most pervasively, the litigation culture —
and the fear of it — has an adverse effect on
the spirit and quality of American life. People
are, as one example, reluctant to join boards of
corporations, even not-for-profit organizations.
Employers are wary about giving honest evalu-
ations of former employees, while at the same
time they are required to supervise the per-
sonal conduct of their workers on the job.
The litigation culture posits that truth and
justice are achieved by a process that pits par-
ties against each other in a no-holds barred
form of simulated warfare. This sends the mes-
sage that disputes are best resolved, and even
social policy made, by adversarial posturing,
contentious argument, and self-serving and
exaggerated statements. It inevitably affects how
citizens view and deal with each other and
consequently the overall tone of society. The
litigation culture makes Americans suspicious
and institutionalizes a spirit of hostile relation-
ships. Society is organized on adversarial
grounds rather than by cooperation or at least
civil disagreement. At the same time, ironi-
cally, the enhanced role of law and doubts
about its efficiency and fairness reduce respect
for the law and threaten the rule of law. While
giving the impression of doing justice, it too
often does the reverse. 65
Walter Olson has observed that the litiga-
tion culture is consistent with no theory of
social organization: “No philosophy that cham-
pions the rights of individuals should accept
14
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the irresponsible deployment of compulsory
process against private citizens or the suppres-
sion of free contract…. No philosophy of com-
munity and mutual aid should welcome a re-
gime of law that sets people against each other
in adversarial bitterness at every turn.”66
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Part II
Incentives to Avoid Litigation
Because of the conditions we have described,
we believe it is important to offer Americans
alternatives to litigation. Therefore, we recom-
mend below the introduction and use of mecha-
nisms that give injured parties the opportunity
and the option to collect fair compensation
without litigation. These mechanisms in effect
use the money that is now spent in operating
the litigation system and paying non-economic
damages to provide more victims with com-
pensation for their economic losses without
litigation and more quickly than under the
current system. They exploit the very ineffi-
ciency and injustice of the litigation system, in
jujitsu fashion, to construct alternatives to that
system.67
The Early Offers approach we recommend
first encourages potential defendants to offer
compensation to claimants and encourages
claimants to accept. The second plan we rec-
ommend, Auto Choice, reduces the premiums
paid by motorists and provides them with more
compensation for economic loss resulting from
personal injury, more promptly paid.
STRIKING THE
APPROPRIATE BALANCE
Compensation can be provided more
quickly and more efficiently if the injured party
is not required to prove fault. Various arrange-
ments provide compensation for injury in this
way. One example is first-party insurance for
health, life, disability, and fire risks. The in-
surer agrees with its policyholders to reimburse
them for defined events without considering
who or what caused the event.
Compensation without proof of fault has
been required by statute in selected areas. Stat-
utes either mandate the purchase of first-party
insurance (no-fault automobile insurance) or
provide a compensation scheme that is equiva-
lent to first-party insurance, although nomi-
nally paid by third persons. Examples of the
latter are arrangements such as workers’ com-
pensation (paid by the employer), compensa-
tion for vaccine injuries (paid by a tax on the
manufacturers), and compensation for babies
born with neurological defects (paid by a tax
on hospitals and obstetricians).
In these instances causation is relatively
clear, even before the event. Injury to automo-
bile drivers in most cases is caused by their use
of the car. A birth defect in at least one sense
was “caused” by the birth. It is usually clear
whether an employee’s injury is work-related.
However, it has proved difficult in other
areas to determine causation before an injury
occurs, and mechanisms have not emerged for
paying compensation without litigation as to
responsibility. The death of a hospitalized
patient, for instance, may have been caused by
the course of the illness itself or by an action
taken by any of the numerous individuals who
provided care. Or an injury related to use of a
product may have been caused not by a defect
but by how it was used or by any of a number of
other actions leading to the injury.
The need, therefore, is to balance the goal
of efficiently compensating victims by avoiding
litigation against the importance of litigating
responsibility for injury. The challenge is to
provide incentives that make it worthwhile for
a potential defendant to enter into an agree-
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ment to pay compensation in appropriate cases
without requiring the injured party to prove
the defendant was at fault. It will often be diffi-
cult, however, for the parties to agree on causa-
tion and responsibility before an event actually
occurs.
One way to avoid the need for a pre-event
agreement between the producer and the con-
sumer is for the producer unilaterally to deter-
mine, before any injury, the conditions under
which the producer will offer to pay defined
compensation. The consumer then can decide,
after an injury, whether to accept such an offer.
To increase the legal enforceability of the com-
mitment, the producer can enter into a pre-
event contract with a third party (such as an
insurance company) to make the offer after an
injury that meets the defined circumstances.68
The pre-event commitment would prescribe
the conditions under which an offer would be
made, relating, for instance, to the cause, type,
and extent of injury. If an event fell within
those conditions, the producer (or the insur-
ance company with which he had contracted)
would be obligated to make the defined offer.
In this way the offer could be accompanied by
an explanation that it was being made pursu-
ant to the pre-existing obligation and conse-
quently did not represent an evaluation of the
validity of the particular claim. The explana-
tion also could state that the offer was non-
negotiable and made pursuant to an obligatory
formula. This would mitigate any implication
that the offeror thought his case was weak and
any inference that the offer was only an open-
ing move in a negotiation process.
Injured parties would have the option to
accept or reject the offer. Because they would
not be parties to a pre-event agreement, they
could decide after the event whether to accept
the compensation offer. The opportunity to
secure compensation without having to under-
take the risk or delay of litigation would often
be persuasive. By the same token, the producer
avoids the expense, adverse publicity, and dis-
traction of litigation, as well as the risk of a
judgment that includes non-economic dam-
ages.
This approach has been successfully applied
in practice. A number of school districts that
were concerned about their potential liability
for serious sports injuries contracted with an
insurer to offer to pay students’ economic losses
resulting from a serious injury (defined by the
level of medical bills) suffered in the course of
school athletics. The students had the option
to reject the offer and resort to the tort system.
If they accepted, they received an immediate
commitment from the insurer to pay their eco-
nomic losses without having to go through liti-
gation. With rare exceptions, injured students
accepted the offers, believing that immediate
compensation was preferable to undertaking
years of litigation in the hope of establishing
liability and eventually collecting compensa-
tion for their economic loss and enough
non-economic damages to pay their attorneys’
fees. 69
This approach provides incentives to both
sides to avoid litigation. It can be done by
private agreement and without the need for
legislation. However, it requires producers to
determine on a general basis and prospectively
the circumstances under which they will offer
to pay compensation. This is difficult to do.
Compensation is likely to be paid without
litigation in more circumstances if potential
defendants can decide after the event whether
to make an offer. This approach avoids the
need to predict the conditions under which
they believe that compensation is appropriate.
However, since they will not have made a pre-
event commitment such as that discussed be-
fore, producers may not make an offer, par-
ticularly because of fear that by doing so they
would give a signal of weakness to the claim-
ant. To increase the number of offers, there-
fore, there must be an incentive for producers
to make offers, as well as for claimants to
accept them.
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Part II: Incentives to Avoid Litigation
EARLY OFFERS
OF COMPENSATION
The Early Offers mechanism we describe in
this section is designed specifically to provide
those incentives for both the consumer and
the producer.70
Early Offers in General
Under this approach producers who believe
a claim might be (or has been) made against
them for an event would be encouraged to
make, on a case-by-case basis, an early settle-
ment offer after the injury. They would not be
required to make an offer and would not have
to define before the event the conditions un-
der which they would make an offer. Recipro-
cal incentives are introduced to encourage the
potential defendants to make an offer and the
claimants to accept it. The Early Offers com-
pensation arrangement can be implemented
by either Federal or state legislation.
A bill to implement this approach was first
introduced by Congressmen Henson Moore
and Richard Gephardt in 1984.71 More recently,
a revised version was introduced by Senator
Mitch McConnell.72 To receive the benefits pro-
vided by the arrangement, any offer made by
the potential defendant has to meet a number
of conditions. It must satisfy a formula speci-
fied by the statute, such as a commitment to
pay all the injured person’s economic loss (net
of collateral sources) as it occurs over time. An
offer would represent a commitment to make
payments not only for uncompensated wage
loss, medical care, and rehabilitation expense,
but also for additional items such as the cost of
fixing up claimants’ houses to accommodate
any disability and the cost of hiring replace-
ment services if they were no longer able to
perform household activities.
Compensation would be paid as the loss was
incurred over time. The person responsible for
making the payments could be required by the
legislation to secure the obligation by purchas-
ing a bond or annuity policy from a qualified
financial institution.
The offer of compensation would be re-
quired to include the reasonable fees of the
claimant’s lawyer. The value of an accepted
offer, therefore, would not be diminished by
attorneys’ fees; claimants who accepted an
offer would receive compensation for all their
economic damages.
To further balance the parties’ interests,
and to give the claimant early relief, an offer
would not be a qualifying one unless it were
tendered within a certain amount of time (e.g.,
120 days). This could be calculated, as pro-
vided by the implementing statute, from the
event, from the dispatch of a pre-filing notifi-
cation in cases where the person making the
offer could not be expected to know that a
claim was possible, or from the filing of a law-
suit.
A pre-filing notification would require pro-
spective plaintiffs to notify potential defendants,
before they filed a lawsuit, of the events that
they believed supported the suit. In many cases
the first notice a party receives is receipt of a
summons and complaint starting the lawsuit
(often accompanied by demands to begin dis-
covery). Not only may defendants not have any
advance notice that they are about to be sued,
they may not even know that they have taken
an action that might have harmed another
person, or done so by not taking an action.
This lack of prior warning is unfair, and it
raises the anger level of the litigation (and
indeed is intended by plaintiffs to be confron-
tational). Most importantly, it makes settlement
more difficult. Requiring pre-suit notification
would improve the climate and make settle-
ment under Early Offers more likely. The claim-
ants themselves, not their lawyers, should be
required to sign the notice. In this way, the
prospective plaintiff would bear more respon-
sibility for the letter, and it would be less threat-
ening to the recipient.
Potential claimants have an incentive to ac-
cept a qualifying offer. They receive a rapid
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commitment to pay their economic loss with-
out litigation. The Early Offers plan introduces
a further incentive for them to accept—and
for defendants to make the offer: if a qualify-
ing offer is made and the potential claimant
rejects it and goes to court, the resulting litiga-
tion would be conducted under rules that were
less favorable to the plaintiff. These restric-
tions would apply only where the claimant had
been tendered a qualifying Early Offer to pay
economic losses and rejected it in the hope of
collecting non-economic damages. Various re-
strictions can be used as incentives.
Under the McConnell bill, a plaintiff who
refuses a qualifying offer would be subject to a
higher burden of proof (clear and convincing
evidence) and a different standard of liability
(intentional or wanton misconduct) for recov-
ery of non-economic damages. The higher stan-
dards could apply to the recovery of economic
damages as well, to encourage offers and ac-
ceptances. Acceptance of an offer also could
be encouraged by requiring a claimant who
rejects a qualifying offer to pay the defendant’s
legal fees if the plaintiff does not win the result-
ing case or does not win as much as was previ-
ously offered.
It is possible that a claimant could accept an
offer for economic damages and (as is the case
whenever one of several defendants settles)
then use the assurance of receiving compensa-
tion for economic loss to finance a virtually
risk-free effort to collect non-economic dam-
ages from other participants in the event. To
avoid this result and to reduce litigation, the
Early Offer could include other people who
might be sued. The person making the offer
could include the other actors. If the offeror
did not do so, the others could demand to be
included. The participants typically would be
covered by insurance companies that did busi-
ness with each other on an on-going basis, and
they would be expected to decide among them-
selves how to divide responsibility for payments
made to the claimant. If they did not agree,
allocation of responsibility for the payment
could be settled by arbitration among them-
selves and without involving the claimant as a
party.
Other Benefits of Early Offers
The Early Offers plan significantly neutral-
izes the possibility that injured parties will in-
terpret a settlement offer as an opening gam-
bit in negotiations and as a signal that they
could eventually recover more, which would
spur further litigation. If the qualifying offer is
accepted, there is no further litigation. If it is
rejected and the claimant goes to court, the
statute would provide not only that the Early
Offer could not be revealed to the fact finder
but also that the rules of the subsequent litiga-
tion would be different. Any tactical comfort
that the claimant would find in the fact that an
Early Offer was made would be offset by the
effect a rejected offer has in the conduct of the
resulting litigation.
Early Offers requires a potential defendant
who wants to use it to make a settlement offer
very early in the dispute process — in some
cases even before lawyers have been retained
but in most cases before they have dug in for a
fight. This ensures that victims can receive rapid
payment of compensation, when they most
need it.
Early Offers also enhances public safety.
The need to make a quick offer will encourage
rapid reporting of adverse events within an
organization, since the opportunity to make a
qualifying offer can under certain circum-
stances be lost if not made quickly after an
event. This practice will improve information
gathering by the producer and thus facilitate
any needed improvements in its operations.
The dynamic of Early Offers confers a fur-
ther and unique benefit. It may calm the ani-
mosities that emerge from an incident, rather
than inflaming them as the litigation culture
now does. It permits those who cause an injury
to admit it and even to discuss what hap-
pened—the normal human response—with-
out fear that doing so will nullify their insur-
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ance coverage or be used against them in a
subsequent liability action if the offer is re-
jected. Under the current system, on the other
hand, an apology, admission of fault, or even
an explanation of the event, can at the same
time nullify the insurance coverage and in-
crease the claimant’s chance of recovery in any
subsequent lawsuit.
This process of discussion and explanation
could be made mandatory as a further induce-
ment to settlement. The Early Offers plan could
provide that if a claimant accepts an Early Of-
fer and wishes to receive an explanation of the
incident, the offeror must provide it in order
to make the acceptance effective. It could re-
quire the offeror, if requested, to meet with
the accepting claimant to give the explanation.
This would enhance the incentive for claim-
ants to accept an offer and would increase the
instances in which the offer is psychologically
beneficial to them.
Early Offers, therefore, permits the parties
to discuss what happened and makes apologies
possible, instead of forcing the potential de-
fendant immediately into a defensively com-
bative posture. It fosters understanding and
cooperation rather than antagonism. This is
particularly important where there is a per-
sonal relationship between the claimant and
the producer, as in the case of medical care.
Applications of Early Offers
BASIC PLAN
Early Offers can apply in a broad range of
matters. Its basic structure is tailored to tort
claims for injury resulting from a product or
service. A producer presented with a claim that
his product caused injury could make a qualify-
ing offer. Early Offers could also be used in
automobile accidents.73 Drivers who believed
they were negligent could (presumably through
their insurance company) make a qualifying
offer to compensate those they injured for the
economic loss.
EXTENSION TO NEW RIGHTS
Early Offers could be expanded beyond tra-
ditional tort claims to cases involving rights
created by legislatures. For instance, in em-
ployment cases, if an employee makes a claim
of discrimination, the employer could make a
qualifying offer, and the employee could ei-
ther accept the offer or go to court under the
changed rules. In each category of case, the
qualifying offer would have to be defined by
statute. Net economic loss is a standard for
tort; for employment discrimination, for in-
stance, it could be lost wages for a stated num-
ber of years, or scheduled amounts for various
types of conduct.
REFORM OF CONTINGENCY FEES
A variant of Early Offers could be applied to
create strong economic incentives to protect
plaintiffs from paying contingency fees that are
not commensurate with the risk and effort un-
dertaken by the lawyer.
The possibility that the plaintiff would have
to pay excess contingency fees can be used to
increase the incentives for settlement. At no
additional cost to the defendant, more money
can be made available to the plaintiff by limit-
ing unwarranted contingency fees. Defendants
could make a settlement offer (as fashioned by
them and independent of the formula for a
qualifying Early Offer) within a short time after
a claim was made. The lawyer’s contingent fee
on the amount of the settlement offer, whether
accepted or rejected and subsequently recov-
ered through settlement or litigation, would be
limited to hourly charges or to some percent-
age (e.g., 10 percent of the settlement offer)
that would be substantially less than the per-
centage that would otherwise be permitted (usu-
ally 33 percent or more).74 This could be ac-
complished by court rule or legislation. Because
more of the settlement offer would be available
for the plaintiff, settlement would be more
likely.
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MASS TORTS
The Early Offers approach also has the po-
tential to resolve cases in which there are a
large number of plaintiffs. While one may be
dubious about the applicability of the arrange-
ment in cases with such large potential liability
for the defendant, it provides benefits to both
sides and could work even in such cases. A
defendant who faces a large number of claims
could make an Early Offer. Or, if some claim-
ants had won a judgment, a defendant who was
faced with claims from multiple other alleged
victims could make an Early Offer to settle
them. To the extent a class lawsuit is driven by
plaintiffs’ interests, rather than those of their
lawyer, they would have the same incentive as
other claimants, suing individually, to accept.75
A generally applicable statute structuring Early
Offers might work in these cases without ad-
justment. If, however, it did not induce enough
offers and acceptances, the statute could be
tailored to the particular situation.
There may be cases, however, in which the
defendant could not make an offer of eco-
nomic damages without risking its own destruc-
tion. In that case, the legislature could set dif-
ferent terms for a qualifying offer. If the
defendant were not willing to make qualifying
offers under the defined terms, it would be
subject to a mass-plaintiff class action as it is
now.
Issues in the Application of Early Offers
Certain criticisms have been raised about
Early Offers. One is that it might open the
door to more claims than are now being filed.
This criticism misses the point of the Early
Offers approach, and indeed of the civil justice
system. If more wrongfully injured people are
compensated more adequately and more
quickly for genuine economic loss, while less
money goes to pay the transaction costs of the
litigation system and the payment of non-eco-
nomic damages, that is a gain for society. The
purpose of Early Offers is not to reduce plain-
tiffs’ recovery. It is designed to avoid the ad-
verse economic and societal effects of litiga-
tion, simultaneously saving money for defen-
dants and providing more net compensation
more quickly for more injured parties.
Questionable claims are not likely to re-
ceive Early Offers. The decision as to whether
or not to make an offer rests in the hands of
the (potential) defendants. They will not make
an offer unless they believe doing so is more
advantageous than spending the money for
defense costs under the litigation system and
taking the risk of losing the case and ultimately
paying large non-economic damages. If a claim
clearly lacks merit, the defendant is not likely
to make an offer.
Another criticism argues, conversely, that
potential defendants will not make enough
offers—that they will make them only where
they have acted egregiously and anticipate hav-
ing to pay large amounts of non-economic
damages. One defense lawyer, however, has
estimated that, given the risks and costs of
litigation, defendants would make the offer in
200 of the 250 cases his firm was handling.76
Nevertheless, even if offers were made only
where the defendant expected to lose, the ar-
rangement would be effective. Claimants have
a choice. They can accept the offer and receive
a commitment for payment of economic dam-
ages quickly and without having to go through
the litigation system. Or they can reject it. All
they “lose” by accepting the offer is the possi-
bility that they may eventually collect a payoff
of non-economic damages, much of which in
any event would go to pay the legal fees they
avoid by accepting the offer.
We believe that leaving open the possibility
that claimants may recover non-economic dam-
ages in excess of their lawyers’ fees is less valu-
able and less important than ensuring that
they receive full compensation quickly for their
economic loss. In any event, if claimants reject
the offer, they remain free to go to court to
prove, under a higher evidentiary standard,
that the conduct was wanton or intentional
and to collect non-economic damages. In this
way, the tort litigation system is avoided for
more routine cases, but left for the serious
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cases involving the worst conduct, where it is
more appropriate.
It has also been asserted that Early Offers is
unfair to those who do not work or who have
low-wage jobs and therefore suffer less eco-
nomic loss.77 The contention is that this dis-
criminates against the poor and retired; they
have less economic damage to recover, and
their ability to collect non-economic damages
is affected if an offer is made and rejected.
Complaints that poor victims will receive “only”
their economic damages betray the distortions
of the litigation system. It harks back to the
“Hit Me, I Need the Money” bumper sticker.
We believe it is better both for individual vic-
tims and society as a whole that victims recover
economic losses quickly than to be forced into
litigation, from which only some will emerge
with recoveries larger than their economic loss.
Early Offers would provide poor accident
victims significant improvements over the
present compensation system. It would encour-
age speedy compensation for medical costs and
lost wages to those who are most likely to need
the money immediately. And, as discussed be-
fore, poor victims are less likely to pursue litiga-
tion than those with higher incomes, and if
they do recover are likely to receive lower
amounts.
Finally, there is a question of whether Early
Offers operates fairly where there is a serious
injury that results in insignificant economic
damages. The problem is not likely to occur
often. A serious injury is likely to result in eco-
nomic loss (lost wages and medical and reha-
bilitation expenses). Thus most victims who
have suffered a serious injury will be compen-
sated for their economic loss in exchange for
giving up the right to pursue non-economic
damages.
If, moreover, the defendant’s conduct is
egregious (intentional or wanton) and can be
established by clear and convincing evidence,
the victim can recover non-economic damages,
even if an Early Offer is made and rejected.
Early Offers provides a mechanism for encour-
aging settlement of cases of ordinary negli-
gence, while leaving the traditional remedies
available for victims of more serious wrongdo-
ing.
There may, however, be cases in which the
economic loss is relatively insignificant com-
pared with the potential for recovery of non-
economic damages and the particular claimant
cannot establish wanton or intentional miscon-
duct under the heightened burden of proof.
The question, therefore, is whether qualifying
Early Offers should be required to include an
amount for non-economic damages.
Early Offers works through a balance. Vic-
tims who suffer economic loss are compensated
quickly and without litigation in exchange for
forgoing the opportunity to pursue non-eco-
nomic damages. This tradeoff provides the in-
centive for defendants to make an offer. They
give up the chance to establish in court that
they are not legally responsible and commit to
pay compensation in exchange for avoiding
the cost of litigation and possible non-economic
damages. If an Early Offer were required to
include compensation for non-economic losses,
the incentive for potential defendants to make
an offer would be reduced. They are more likely
to insist on denying liability and litigating if the
only Early Offer they can make is one compa-
rable to what they could expect as a worse case
outcome from the litigation, particularly since
compensation under Early Offers is paid
promptly without the deferral that litigation
and appeals provide even to a losing defen-
dant.
Prospective defendants thus would have little
incentive to make an offer that in effect quickly
conceded what the plaintiffs would otherwise
be able to recover only if they were successful in
litigation after substantial effort and expense
over an extended time. As a result, fewer offers
would be made, and fewer victims would re-
ceive rapid commitments to compensate them
for their economic loss.
 Workers already are compensated under
an even more restrictive tradeoff. Workers’ com-
pensation provides no payment for non-eco-
nomic loss (except for scheduled payments for
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certain defined injuries, such as loss of a limb).
Workers do not have the opportunity to reject
the compensation and pursue litigation for non-
economic damages that is available under Early
Offers. In exchange, they receive compensa-
tion for work-related injuries without having to
establish that the employer was at fault. This
exchange has been determined to be socially
beneficial and is mandatory on the worker. We
believe similarly that it is more important to
compensate more victims for their economic
loss without litigation than to add compensa-
tion for non-economic loss to Early Offers.
Victims of clearly egregious conduct, there-
fore, are not affected by the tradeoff. At the
same time the proposal benefits the majority of
victims with more ambiguous claims who may
recover nothing or, if they are “successful,” are
likely to recover less than their economic loss
after a lengthy and costly litigation battle.
 Nevertheless, if it is thought appropriate to
include non-economic damages, the Early Of-
fers plan could require that a qualifying offer
be made with a minimum or scheduled amount
for specified grievous injuries in addition to
the commitment to pay net economic loss (like
workers’ compensation).78 In deciding whether
to require such offers for non-economic dam-
ages, however, it must be remembered that the
more such requirements are added to Early
Offers, the fewer offers for payment of eco-
nomic loss will be made.
Early Offers exchanges a rapid commitment
by the potential defendant to provide poten-
tially long-range and expensive compensation
of the claimant’s economic damages for the
claimant’s ticket in the lottery for non-economic
damages. Both parties avoid litigation, and com-
pensation is provided more rapidly and more
fairly. This mechanism would reduce litigation,
for the benefit of the potential litigants and of
society in general. It is a principled and practi-
cal mechanism that should be applied widely.
We recommend that the legislation necessary
to implement Early Offers be enacted, at
either the Federal or state level, and that po-
tential litigants use it whenever possible.
AUTO CHOICE INSURANCE
Another plan for introducing economic in-
centives to avoid litigation has been worked
out specifically for handling personal injuries
in automobile accidents. Auto Choice is a sec-
ond comprehensive scheme that provides rapid
compensation of economic loss in exchange
for forgoing pursuit of non-economic damages.
 Auto Choice gives car owners, for both per-
sonal and business use, the option to obtain
less expensive insurance that pays economic
compensation for personal injury quickly.79 The
present compensation system, achieved through
litigation, pays nearly three times as much for
the lawyers who run it and for the fraud that
results from the availability of non-economic
damages as for real medical costs and lost
wages.80 The Insurance Research Council has
found that auto insurance claimants who hire
attorneys receive average net settlements that
are lower than claimants who do not, even
though they incur larger damages. This is be-
cause claimants pay an estimated 32 percent of
their gross settlements in legal expenses.81 By
offering a way to provide compensation with-
out litigation in most cases, Auto Choice offers
consumers both lower premiums for their in-
surance and higher recoveries, on average, for
serious personal injury than the present sys-
tem.
The proposal is most recently embodied in
legislation introduced in Congress.82 Although
it is currently the subject of Federal legislation,
the proposal also could be implemented by
state legislation.
Under the bills now pending before Con-
gress, drivers would be offered a choice be-
tween two kinds of personal injury insurance:
one would cover their economic losses without
proof of fault (Personal Injury Protection, or
PIP); the other would cover economic and non-
economic damages upon proof of fault under
the rules of the conventional tort system (Tort
Maintenance Coverage, or TMC).
Under PIP coverage, drivers collect only eco-
nomic damages, from their own insurer, but
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Figure 5
Estimated Savings from Auto Choice
in 1998
SOURCE: Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Auto Choice:
Impact on Cities and the Poor, 1998.
Private Commercial Total
Average premium
  savings 22.8% 27.5% 23.7%
Average savings
  per car $184 — —
Savings for
  low-income drivers 36% — —
Total available
  savings if 100%
  switch (billions) $27.4 $8.1 $35.5
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do not have to prove negligence to do so. The
PIP driver can neither sue nor be sued for non-
economic damages. Injured PIP drivers may
sue under the traditional fault-based system for
economic damages that exceed their own
policy’s coverage limits.
With TMC, drivers must prove the other
driver’s negligence, going through the litiga-
tion system as now but naming their own in-
surer as the defendant, as is currently the case
under uninsured motorists coverage.83 If they
prevail, they can collect non-economic as well
as economic damages.
Because PIP avoids proof of fault and dis-
penses with non-economic damages, it avoids
most of the cost of the litigation system. TMC,
however, preserves non-economic damages,
requires proof of fault, and thus continues the
current litigation system. PIP will be substan-
tially less expensive than TMC. It is estimated
that Auto Choice (in the form of the proposed
Federal legislation) would on average reduce
auto insurance premiums 23-24 percent (55-57
percent for the personal injury component of
the insurance).84 The Joint Economic Commit-
tee of the United States Congress has estimated
the savings at $184 per car per year, implying
that total savings would be approximately $35
billion per year if all motorists selected PIP.
(See Figure 5). Of this, $27 billion would be
saved by consumers.85
This is particularly important for low-income
families. The lowest income quintile now spends
16.3 percent of household income for car in-
surance. Low-income drivers, in general, could
reduce their premiums by 36 percent under
Auto Choice.86 These savings for low-income
consumers would be especially significant for
residents of cities. They need cars to work, but
the cost of insurance in these areas can be
prohibitive. Affordable auto insurance will help
city dwellers find work and at the same time
alleviate the problem of uninsured motorists.87
Business also would benefit from selection
of the PIP alternative. Nearly 40 percent of all
automobile cases that go to trial are against
businesses, and 39 percent of all tort cases
against business are related to car ownership.88
With PIP, businesses could save 27 percent of
their auto premium costs, or $8 billion in the
aggregate.89
Because drivers may choose between the
different types of insurance, an accident may
involve a driver who has selected PIP coverage
and one who has not. This creates complexi-
ties that may be handled in different ways.
Under the proposal in Congress, PIP drivers
would be compensated for their economic loss
resulting from an injury whether they were
negligent or not and whether the other driver
was negligent or not. TMC drivers would col-
lect from their own insurer if they could prove
negligence of the PIP driver.90 Either a PIP or a
TMC driver could sue the other driver for any
economic loss in excess of their own first-party
coverage; traditional principles of fault would
apply. (Figure 6, page 24, is a schematic of how
Auto Choice works.)
The approach can include appropriate ex-
ceptions. The proposed Federal legislation, for
instance, permits recovery for non-economic
loss by or against PIP drivers if they or the
other driver were driving under the influence
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How Auto Choice Works
Recovery of economic and
non-economic damages unaffected.
TMC drivers
recover pain and
suffering as well as
medical and wage
losses from their
own TMC policy.
PIP drivers collect
medical and wage
losses from own
PIP policy. Dam-
ages above policy
limits can be
recovered from the
other driver, based
on fault.
Both drivers collect economic
damages from own PIP policy, up
to policy limits. Economic dam-
ages above policy limits can be
recovered from the other driver,
based on fault.
Buys tort main-
tenance coverage
(TMC) to cover
accidents with
drivers who
switch to new
system.
Buys personal
injury protec-
tion (PIP)
insurance.
 Accident Between
 a TMC Driver
 and a PIP Driver
Accident Between
2 PIP Drivers
Driver Stays with
Current System
(TMC driver)
Driver Switches
to New System
(PIP driver)
SOURCE: Joint Economic Committee of Congress
Accident Between
2 TMC Drivers
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of alcohol or illegal drugs or committed inten-
tional misconduct. In that case the traditional
tort system would apply, as it would if two TMC
motorists collided; both economic and non-
economic damages could be awarded upon
proof of fault.91
Auto Choice would enable drivers to buy
the amount of coverage (above state-mandated
minimums) that they believe is appropriate to
protect themselves from economic loss, includ-
ing that caused by the negligent actions of
others. Under the current system, an innocent
driver who is injured by the negligence of an-
other is able to recover damages only if the
other person has sufficient insurance coverage
to pay the damages.92 Auto Choice, on the
other hand, enables drivers to determine for
themselves the level of insurance payment when
they are injured, whether by their own or an-
other driver’s negligence, and whether they
select PIP or TMC. The injured drivers’ ability
to be compensated does not turn on the
amount of insurance a wrongdoer may carry
but is within their own control. The essential
features of Auto Choice in comparison with
the current system are outlined in Figure 7,
page 26.
The Joint Economic Committee has sum-
marized the benefits of the Auto Choice
approach, emphasizing the fact that it gives
consumers a choice and a chance to realize
savings by opting out of the traditional tort
system. As its report says, “… pain and suffer-
ing premiums are unbundled from economic
damage premiums…[and]… insurance is pri-
marily shifted to a first-party basis.” By unbun-
dling the tort rights, Auto Choice “constitutes
a significant improvement over the current situ-
ation in which all individuals are forced to
purchase essentially the same type of coverage
[requiring proof of fault], regardless of their
individual preferences and tastes.” At the same
time, it compensates for serious injuries better
than the present system, because drivers can,
in purchasing first-party insurance, determine
their own coverage levels, whereas under the
current system they are as a practical matter “at
the mercy of policy limits set by” the driver who
injures them.93
Auto Choice has been criticized on the
ground that bad drivers would not have to pay
for the cost they impose on others and hence
that more bad drivers would be on the road
than under the current system.94 Apparently
the concern is that since PIP drivers could not
be sued for non-economic losses, they would
have lower premiums (as indeed is the pur-
pose of the plan) and thus bad drivers could
avoid the costs of their bad driving by choosing
PIP. In effect, the argument is that awards for
non-economic damages are necessary to raise
the premiums of bad drivers and discourage
them from driving.
However, this criticism overlooks several fea-
tures of Auto Choice. Insurers can raise the
premiums of drivers involved in accidents even
if they do not have to cover non-economic
damages. The PIP insurer will know of acci-
dents involving its insured drivers. As contem-
plated by the pending legislation, PIP does not
apply if a driver causes only property damage.
The PIP insurer will cover claims filed against
it for that loss under conventional tort cover-
age and will learn of the accident when the
other driver makes a property damage claim. If
PIP drivers injure themselves, they will file
claims against their insurers. Only if PIP driv-
ers injure another, but not themselves, and are
somehow able to do so without causing prop-
erty damage, will claims not be filed with their
insurers—a rare congruence of events.
Even then, PIP drivers’ insurance compa-
nies can and will learn of their driving records.
The insurer will require the driver to report
relevant information as a condition of cover-
age (with the threat of cancellation for false
answers), and it will review the records of the
police and motor vehicles departments. In al-
most every case, therefore, the insurance com-
pany will know if a driver it insures presents a
high risk, and it can rate accordingly.
In any event, relying on higher premiums
may not be the best way to promote safety. The
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Figure 7
Comparison of Fault Liability Insurance System and the Personal Injury Protection (PIP)
System of Auto Choice
SOURCE: The Coalition for Auto-Insurance Reform.
Fault/Liability Insurance System Personal Injury Protection System
Pays no benefits to more than 30% of all
accident victims (often the victims of Pays benefits to all accident victims.
single-car accidents).
Pays benefits contingent on other driver’s Pays benefits to all accident victims,
fault. regardless of fault.
Fraud: more than one-third of all medical
claims are fraudulent to support higher
non-economic damage awards.
Recovery contingent on other driver’s Recovery determined by individual’s own
behavior and auto insurance coverage. choice of insurance coverage.
•   Minor injuries compensated at an •   All economic loss compensated up to
     average of 2 to 3 times economic loss.      the level of coverage selected.
•   Serious injuries compensated at an •   Victim may sue for excess economic
     average of less than 50% of economic loss.      loss.
In serious injury cases, pays for losses only after In all cases, pays for insured losses within
trial or settlement, which can take 2 to 3 years. 30 days of submission of a bill.
Eliminates the need for most lawyers.
Uses the savings to pay more injured people
more equitably and to lower premiums.
Reduces incentives for fraud by eliminating
recovery of non-economic damages.
Pays more dollars for lawyers than for
victims’ legitimate medical bills and lost wages.
higher premiums caused by the current sys-
tem affect everyone—good and bad drivers
alike. In some urban areas, 50 percent or more
of the drivers already are uninsured, despite
laws requiring the purchase of insurance.95
The people they hit have no recourse except
to the extent they have purchased uninsured
motorists coverage. Auto Choice would en-
able drivers better to protect themselves at a
lower premium. Good drivers, therefore, will
be better protected. People who do not now
buy insurance because of the cost will be more
likely to buy insurance. High-risk drivers will
still pay higher premiums than others, but are
more likely to be insured.
Auto Choice is a detailed example of a pre-
event contract mechanism, implemented
through statute, that offers consumers a choice
of whether they want to go through the litiga-
tion system or accept defined compensation
(in this case, economic damages) without re-
sort to litigation. Payment without proof of
fault works in this circumstance because the
cause of automobile accidents is relatively clear.
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Auto Choice appears to work particularly well
because insurance is a major purchase and
consumers save a significant amount of money
immediately. In addition, the person offering
the choice (the insurer) is not suggesting that
its product will injure anyone. The insurer
merely agrees that if the purchaser of its prod-
uct (insurance) is injured in the course of us-
ing a product supplied by someone else (the
car), compensation will be handled under one
scheme rather than another. Further, the
choice is offered when the consumer has al-
ready decided to buy the product. The driver
already is in the market for insurance. Auto
Choice offers the consumer a choice of two
different models of that product.
Adoption of Auto Choice will benefit the
litigation system generally. Litigation relating
to motor vehicle accidents is a large part of the
courts’ caseloads. Approximately 60 percent of
all tort cases relate to automobile accidents; 59
percent of those who receive tort liability pay-
ment are injured in motor vehicle accidents,
and they receive 75 percent of the total dollar
compensation paid to accident victims of all
sorts.96 Removing a significant number of these
cases from the litigation system will reduce the
pressure on courts, as well as helping the acci-
dent victims themselves. As a result, other types
of litigation, which cannot be avoided by Auto
Choice or by the Early Offers approach, should
receive more rapid and better justice.
We recommend that Auto Choice be imple-
mented, at either the Federal or state level. In
its own right, Auto Choice will save substantial
amounts of money for drivers. It will reduce
the number of cases brought to the courts and
thus make justice more accessible to others
who need to use the courts. Most importantly,
its success would demonstrate the benefits of
compensation systems that avoid litigation. We
recommend that efforts be made to develop
ways of extending this approach to other sec-
tors.97
Part II: Incentives to Avoid Litigation
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The litigation system is neither fair nor effi-
cient. It is harmful to the participants and to
society as a whole. America relies too heavily
and too easily on litigation as the way to resolve
disputes and provide compensation.
We recommend two mechanisms that offer
potential litigants — both plaintiffs and defen-
dants — an option to avoid litigation and eco-
nomic incentives to exercise it.
1. Early Offers encourages producers to make
an offer to pay compensation after an in-
jury and provides an incentive for claimants
to accept it. We believe this plan would
substantially reduce litigation and provide
more victims more compensation for their
economic loss than the current system. We
urge the legislatures — whether Federal or
state — to enact the necessary measures to
permit Early Offers to work as designed,
and we urge all Americans to invoke the
mechanism once it is in place.
2.  Auto Choice gives American drivers a choice
in the kind of compensation arrangement
they want to apply in case of personal in-
jury. Auto Choice would let them buy less
expensive insurance that provides first-party
coverage of economic loss and avoids litiga-
tion of fault and the award of non-economic
damages. Because it would be less expen-
sive and provide automobile accident vic-
tims compensation more quickly and with-
out litigation, we believe many Americans
would choose this course. We urge the leg-
islatures — whether Federal or state — to
pass the legislation necessary to give Ameri-
cans this choice.
Conclusion
These are balanced reforms. They do not
give defendants unearned benefits. Instead,
they give injured parties the opportunity for
speedy recovery and without litigation.
In the case of Early Offers, defendants and
plaintiffs are given a way to avoid litigation to
the benefit of both. Defendants win this ben-
efit only by making a major commitment—to
pay the victim’s economic loss (which is the
essential purpose of a compensation system).
Claimants—in particular severely injured vic-
tims — benefit by having this new opportunity.
Their rights are changed only if an Early Offer
is made and they decline it — an adjustment
that is necessary to make the new right avail-
able in the first place.
With Auto Choice, drivers can choose to
give up the chance to recover non-economic
damages in exchange for protection against
such suits being brought against them, quicker
compensation for themselves without litigation
if they are injured, and lower insurance premi-
ums. But they are not forced to take this op-
tion. They are given a choice, as they are more
generally with Early Offers.
Our recommendations chart a course for
reform. But they also reflect questions about
the role of law and litigation in American life
that should be explicitly addressed by the Ameri-
can people. We urge a wide-ranging and broadly
participatory debate about the extent to which
the legal system is eroding the essential prin-
ciples of our society. We hope a debate will
lead the American people in the direction of
the reform represented by our recommenda-
tions and stimulate the development of addi-
tional approaches that will restore confidence
in our legal system.
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On the report as a whole, JOSH S. WESTON,
with which STEFFEN E. PALKO, JAMES Q.
RIORDAN, and GEORGE RUPP have asked to
be associated.
The CED subcommittee and Research and
Policy Committee understandably chose to
make two very clear, practical, deserving, and
significant recommendations to federal and
state decision-makers — Early Offers and Auto
Choice.
This policy statement also clearly describes
the general need for additional alternatives
and incentives to reduce litigation. The report’s
suggested process for identifying and imple-
menting additional legal reform is “broad and
informed public debate.”
To complement such public debate with
structure, process, credibility, and expertise, I
recommend that the most senior court in sev-
eral major states and the U.S. Supreme Court
each request funding and directional support
from its respective legislature to create and
guide a Legal Reform Commission that would
be asked to report back to the legislature and
the public within eighteen months.
Such a commission’s members might be
selected by the Chief Justice and his associates.
It might include all or most of the Senior
Court’s justices plus the relevant attorney gen-
eral, a few leading members of the Bar Associa-
tion who are not trial lawyers, and leaders from
business and other groups.
Memorandum of Comment, Reservation, or Dissent
Their charge would be to make significant
recommendations for consequential legal re-
form by legislatures, courts, and regulatory
bodies. They should suggest new processes,
incentives, and educational supplements that
would permit and encourage judges and courts
to judge under the law, rather than create new
law and regulations. In addition, they should
indicate ways to mobilize ongoing judicial
leadership for significant reform.
To this end, pressures from business and
the public at large, and perhaps new processes,
are required to produce legislation that is clear
and unambiguous, so that important policy
choices are not left to regulatory and judicial
bodies for decision. Clear legislation may re-
quire mechanisms that consider the societal
costs and benefits of proposed legislation prior
to enactment, as recommended with respect to
one policy area in CED’s 1998 policy statement
Modernizing Government Regulation: The Need for
Action.
We are aware that most ad hoc government
commissions do not produce effective and ob-
jective legislative or operational changes. How-
ever, we are encouraged by the recent signifi-
cant success of the National Commission to
Restructure the IRS in achieving positive legis-
lative and executive branch changes after just
one year of hearings and deliberation.
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For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contribute
to preserving and strengthening our free society, achiev-
ing steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity and
living standards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving the qual-
ity of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, government,
and education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
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independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
part groups are composed of business executives and scholars and have objec-
tives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods.
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in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as
energy, East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction
of nontariff barriers to trade.
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